It is a
tendency for a structure which has found some partial practical use in a
given context and situation to be extrapolated and applied to other
situations and regions as well. In fact such a structure can become a
preconceived category and part of a projected ontological system with
claims of furnishing a more general understanding of reality. Contrary
to what we have suggested previously it is extremely dubious that
common formal systems can have much direct relevance to our project of a
philosophical psychology, that is, the project of recovering the
first-person introspective science that had many remarkable developments
in the 19th century (many of which appear in Husserl's Logical
Investigations) and which later was tragically and wrongfully rejected
or neglected. We have discussed some important aspect of the project in
previous posts, for instance how it should not be confused with
subjective idealism and also the view adopted on the subject, the body
and the physical world. The method pertaining to formal abstract
research is completely distinct from that of such a philosophical
psychology. The method required actually has more similarity with that
of experimental science (cf. Hume's 'experimental method of reasoning')
though obviously should not be confused with it. Abstract formal
concepts and methods should only come in after substantial progress has
been made in philosophical psychology. After pure introspective insight
and knowledge has been gained (as explained before, it involves the
detached awareness of the stream of inner verbal discourse and
imagination, divided into its sensual species and their web, perceived
in its conceptual dimension as well and as proceeding from a fundamental
process of identification), then through reminiscence the philosopher
may be able to return and attempt to articulate this knowledge in the
language of abstract formal computable systems (maybe the systems of
consciousness has some similarity to the design of operating systems,
themselves based on human social structure). Until then, natural
language remains an imperfect but still amazingly flexible and
serviceable tool. An analogy might be used from software development:
first we must have a global systems theoretic intuition and idea of how
the program is to be structured and work and then can be begin its
concrete coding in a given language and platform. Or rather: first we
must explore and view and know the mind first-hand and only afterwards
can we use known concrete systems as tools or language to present an
approximative model of the mind. All this of course is quite distinct
from the perspective of the Logical Investigations - or Platonic
dialectics - in which the phenomenological reflection on formal and
logic knowledge itself is a starting point.
It might be a very
good thing to dissipate misunderstandings and distortions which would
confuse this first-personal introspective methodology with that of
psychoanalysis (i.e. Jung's analytic psychology), its theory of the
unconscious and its proposed methods of exploration of the latter, or
with the method of the later of Husserl (we have in fact already
discussed this in previous posts). The problem with Jung revolves
around the term 'religion'. This is a large 'monster' vague concept
which is incapable of definition and many partial, idealized and
artificial aspects have been historically abstracted (or sanitized) to
suit particular scientific, historical and philosophical theories. A
question is: do we find in Jung the strange idea that religious beliefs,
practices and narratives should be regarded as potentially
psychological beneficial and therapeutic regardless of their objective
historical, scientific, ethical and even social value and consequence?
Can we say that Jung diagnosed the modern age with 'lack of religion'
and that he proposed a suitably adapted 'religion' as a cure ? (the
problem with Noll's famous book is that is mixes important factual
material with more-or-less obvious intrusions of their author's own
anthropological and historical views). Or is the concept of 'religion'
used by Jung a rather artificial idealized one that would lump together
fundamentally heterogeneous things? If the lover, the poet and all art
involving creative imagination are interpreted as 'religious' then this
is clearly a very different sense of the term than the usual
'theological' and 'ecclesiastic' one (even if we take into account
Hegel's lucubrations about the 'religion of art' of the Greeks and the
similar Hellenism in the writings of Heidegger). And what about
'initiatic' societies like Freemasonry? And Jung's practice of analytic
psychology itself? For now we will pull out from the huge vague term
'religion' a single negative aspect (which links it strongly to the term
'cult') : that of passivity, surrender and dependence on a leader or
group - in which is involved passivity with regards to aspects and
manifestations of one's own psyche which cause lack of cognitive clarity
and calm. Passivity is of course a very difficult and complex term
when applied to consciousness and in Pali buddhism 'passive' (in the
sense usually translated as 'letting go' or 'detachment') and 'active'
aspects are combined in subtle and powerful ways. Jung is wrong in
making an analogy between an alleged western 'extrovert' tendency to
dominate the world and an eastern 'introvert' tendency to dominate the
psyche. There is very little analogy between western material
domination and the goal of original Buddhism which is ultimately not any
kind of 'control' and 'domination': rather its mottos are know thyself
and cure thyself. An obvious difference between our philosophical
psychology and Jung is that imagination, dreams, symbols. images, myths
etc. play a central role for Jung (and note the questionable importance
allocated to 'gender' in Jungian myths, why cannot the sun be
considered feminine as in ancient Japan, ancient Germanic and many other
cultures? ). And such things are indeed found both in the original
Pali texts and in Platonism - but what is really important is their
function and attitude that is displayed towards them therein - and such
function and attitude is quite different in Tibetan Buddhism (Jung was a
keen reader of the Bardö Thodöl, though his personal library also
included the editions of the Pali text society). Jung's interesting
remarks on the salvation of the gods in Buddhism applies to Tibetan
Buddhism.
A questionable aspect of Jung (and Noll certainly
identified this) is that his ideas appear bound up with a kind of
religious, cultural and even 'racial' traditionalism which Noll amply
elaborates on in function of 'völkisch' blood-and-soil ideologies. We
find this aspect of Jung mistaken and harmful, as is the theory of
'psychological types' applied to individuals and a fortiori to human
groups such as the division between East and West or a theory races or
cultures that could be 'aryan' and 'semitic', terms only having meaning
as linguistic classifications. Was Jung somehow ignorant that the
ancestors of the most of the population of the Germany of his times
consisted in a great portion of speakers of Latin, Baltic, West
Slavonic and Celtic alongside Germanic languages?
Contrary to
Jung we claim that cultural material that is factually erroneous,
immoral and which causes psychological harm to oneself and to others,
does not deserve the slightest reverence or respect just for being
'tradition' or being associated with one's ancestors or country. And
that this certainly cannot be a positive basis for psychological and
spiritual progress or self-knowledge. At worst it can be represent a
kind of generational trauma - the 'collective unconscious' should be
viewed as containing very negative things as well, things that were
imprinted through the ages by reigning authorities . Even on the
historical plane so-called 'traditions' reveal themselves not to be
continuous traditions at all, but materially triumphing aspects of a
rugged process of ideological conflict with other equally historically
legitimate 'traditions' which happen to have lost through many disparate
circumstances and factors.
What is truly rooted in our
essence and represents our spiritual continuity, is the spirit of
questioning, criticism, evaluation and potential liberation from what is
bad and wrong in 'tradition', both the social-cultural structure of
the waking world and from contingent negative unconscious influence
(which Jung would essentialize). Foucault, Guattari and Deleuze
correctly hold that the true revolutionary spirit is as much about
self-transformation as social transformation, but fall into error in not
acknowledging that this spirit is itself a continuous and ancient
tradition.
Maybe the 'collective unconscious' of a given
social group does not emerge according some dubious speculation about
man's prehistory, but is rather largely the product of the conscious
creative power of special individuals. Jung himself made a curious
remark that India was not up to what the Buddha wanted to reveal and
teach.
Not only does Jung seem to have a mistaken and uncritical
account of gender and the gendering of imaginary, mythical and
religious figures but we question if in Jung we find a good theory of
the numinous object of consciousness at all, and in particular in the
context of the whole process of the experience of eros and beauty. Does
Jung offer us a phenomenology of the modes of presentation and
functions of an 'object-person' of imaginative consciousness which yet
is perceived to 'be' a known real being or else a person of religious
narratives - and the phenomenology of why particular
object-image-persons are chosen, preferred, come to dominate
consciousness in a numinous revelatory manner, and how these can become
(including through certain spiritual practices) the initiatic vehicles
for achieving higher states of consciousness and spiritual
realization?
Contrary to Jung, we have argued extensively for
the profound affinity - even almost identity - between the philosophy
and spirit of original Pali Buddhism and that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and this correspondence and affinity certainly extends to
later Buddhist philosophy and later modern Western philosophy as well.
Thus we can say that original Pali Buddhism represents to lost soul,
essence and root of what is best in Western humanity, provided we pay
special attention to its knowledge of the universality and
unconditionality of the duty of compassion and non-harm with regards to
all human beings and animals. The collective unconscious of Western
humanity itself needs to be healed and regenerated in the pure
life-giving waters of the critical and revolutionary spirit at once new
and ancient. A very important aspect involves the study and
investigations of ancient Europe (and its links to Druidism, ancient
Greece and the regions in which original Buddhism developed) and the
dispelling once and for all of the harmful myths or partial truths
regarding our ancestors which are patent in Jung . The furor Teutonicus,
the cult of *Wôthanaz are unoriginal foreign elements borrowed from
the warlike tribal gods of the Eurasian steppe nomads as patent from
Beckwith's extensive book on the Silk Road; on the other hand the
seeresses and prophetesses of some Germanic tribes as recounted by Roman
historians were actually Druidic. Without going into this subject, we
remark that the Old Turkic script and the Futhark are strikingly
similar. We attach great importance to the proof of the historical,
cultural and philosophical affinity and continuity between Greco-Roman
antiquity and ancient Celtic speakers (and perhaps even the culture of
the Megalithic monuments). Many of the Germanic speaking tribes
seem to have been at the cross-roads between the
Buddhist-Greco-Roman-Celtic light of humanity and civilization and the
shamanic war-god and war-retinue culture of the Eurasian steppes (which
is associated to Mongolian and Turkic speaking peoples and is not in any
way a specifically 'Indo-European' religion). In the territory of
what is now Germany there is a powerful substrate of Western Slavs and
Balts alongside the older Celtic component which may be associated to
manifestations of higher philosophy and spirituality in Germany (and
similar considerations can be made for Great Britain). The Celtic
genetic and cultural influence in Iceland is very large and we can
speculate that likewise the genetic and cultural influence of the Sámi
on historical Scandinavia has been extensive, though in what can be
reconstructed of 'Viking culture' (the object of distortions and
fantasies in popular media) we find a strong presence of the Nietzschean
war-and-conquest values and culture of the Eurasian Mongolian and
Turkic steppe nomads (cf. the ancient interactions of the Goths and the
Huns).
(Author note: the considerations above are not meant
to imply that there is any essential genetic association between the
historical Turkic speakers at the time and what we consider negative and
lower forms of culture and values. On the contrary we hope to
investigate the existence of higher forms of spirituality, culture and
civilization among Turkic speakers in remote antiquity as well as in
more recent history).
The reason we focused on original
Buddhism is because of its philosophical nature (it is not a 'religion'
in the common sense of this term) and its close correspondence to much
of what is best in ancient and modern western philosophy and
philosophical psychology (thus refuting again the idea of an essential
distinction between east and west). Nor do we wish to suggest that
original Buddhism exhausts ancient wisdom and valid spiritual practices
(one need but glance at the Yoga-Sutra of Patanjali, the works of Plato
or Plotinus to see their variety and complementarity). Also note that
the speculations above on ancient peoples (a topic which deserves many
books) should be taken as based primarily on ethical, religious,
cultural and linguistic divisions without implying any kind of genetic
or 'racial' reductionism or essentialism. In the future we will
address all the standard criticism concerning 'cultural appropriation'
and allegedly taking the artificial restricted secular view of western
scholarship regarding the Pali texts, ignoring the actual living
traditions of the Theravada, etc.
We need not only a typology
but a systematic pathology of spiritual traditions, religions and
cultures. Not simply a linear scale between the poles of purity,
spirituality, interiority, morality, universality, 'philosophicality',
humanism and all their opposites, but an understanding of how
pathological religions and cultures branch into many different and
apparently distinct forms while preserving the same underlying negative
essence. Thus we need to understand better what a tribalist,
sacrifice-based, violent, colonialist, genocidal, fear-based culture
and religion is and not be mislead by classifications like patriarchal
and matriarchal or confuse corrupted forms of certain cultures and
religions with traces of or naturalistic disfigurements of something
more ancient and pure. Pure religion pertains to the science of
consciousness (either solitary or through the transfiguring/manifesting
path of spiritual love and communion) and morality and not to the
natural world other than as an object of love and compassion and
aesthetic numinous transfiguration. It is inconceivable that concepts
like 'caste' or 'race' should have any validity or role therein.
In
other words, any 'higher' or 'pure' religion (if we can even use this
term) is essentially and solely about i) the science of consciousness,
about self-analysis and self-awareness of consciousness ultimately
achieving a liberated super-consciousness, and ii) the transcendental
unfolding of the possibility of human love. Its foundation is
intelligence of the moral law and empathy and compassion. It has
absolutely nothing to do with 'gods' (beyond an imaginative-symbolic
function or as representing possible states of human consciousness).
Although we can certainly conceive of other beings analogous to humans
or even in some sense 'superior' beings existing in other worlds or
planes of existence, attaching a religious significance to a
relationship (worship, faith, sacrifice, prayer, rites, etc) to such
beings (the number being immaterial) is a serious aberration.
We
hope to prove that the history of cultures and religions does not
exhibit anything like a linear progress from so-called 'primitive'
(animistic, naturalistic, war and fertility based, etc.) to so-called
'advanced' religions (as if any religion that can justify cruelty to
human beings and animals, bloodshed and genocide could ever deserve the
designation 'advanced'....) but rather a complex multi-cyclic decay from
higher to lower followed by partial restorations of the higher.
Evidence
can be adduced from the history of India in which many traditions which
exhibit certain key 'higher' non-theistic traits are very ancient -
Yoga (to a certain extent), Nyâya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Pali Buddhism,
Jainism,.... Note that in ancient Greece we have already have as far
back as the 5th century Leucippus and the ethics of Democritus (said
to have traveled extensively and learnt from various now lost
traditions) and Plato's critique of religion in books 2 and 3 of the
Republic and concept of the transcendent good, which surely is just a
transmission of Pythagorean philosophy which, according to Ovid,
completely rejected animal sacrifice. And of extraordinary interest is
Confucionism and the literature of Ch'an and Zen as well as the earlier
highly sophisticated Mahâyâna philosophical texts: all these appears to
contain powerful and complex articulations of a pure science of
consciousness and well as a more-or-less explicit rejection of
'religion' in the common sense (cf. Hui Hai: the sage seeks the Mind not
the Buddha, etc.). Maybe some mysterious ancient people, with some
connection to Manicheism and Zoroasterianism, is behind both Mahâyâna
and ancient Chinese culture.
There are also some special
'divinities' which express something higher, older and non-theistic, the
union between the science of consciousness and the moral and cosmic
order of the world: such are certain ancient luminous feminine figures
incarnating divine wisdom, light, life, compassion and cosmic order
(which also feature prominently in Mahâyâna and Vajrayâna): for instance
the ancient figured of Aredvi Sura Anahita and Daena for the Persians,
Nut for the ancient Egyptians, Athena for the ancient Greeks and to a
certain extent Sophia and Barbelo of the so-called 'gnostic literature
(the origin of the Hag Nammadi library is completely obscure, but it
very likely includes transmissions of now lost later Egyptian,
Phoenician, Syrian and Chaldean traditions alongside other type of
material).
It can furthermore be speculated that many ancient
'theogonies' (as well as perhaps emanationist and gnostic-type
cosmologies) were initially symbolic-mythic expressions of pure
philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness (like the
paticcasamupadda and the system of samkhya, specially as interpreted by
the excellent book by Mikel Burley, 2007) which in themselves had no
more 'religious' significance than the categories of Kant. It is tragic
that so much of the science and philosophy of the ancient world has been
lost (Thracians, Chaldeans, Syrians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Berbers,
Druids,...or lost civilizations like Tartessos.).
All this
again shows a most profound difference from Jung. It is laughable and
displays a colonialist hubris to say that modern western man is on the
average more 'rational' or 'logical' than other parts of humanity
(historical and present). The machines modern man uses are products of
controlled 'rational' thought, but modern western man per se , with all
his capitalist fetishes and commodities, is likely far less 'rational'
and 'logical' (forgetting for a moment the problem of clarification of
such monster concepts) than the average for this planet (historical and
present). The smartphone is a product of the 'rational', the mental
life of the personal buying and using it, mostly not. Also there is not
the slightest evidence that human beings at any period in time did not
have naturally a form of consciousness containing what Jung calls the
'ego'. Another profound difference regards Jung's theory of the
'libido' which is a grotesque distortion of the platonic and neoplatonic
theory of the erôs, a primordial substance and power (prior and more
vast than biological sexuality) which allows spiritual realization
through a mediating and transfiguring spiritual communion with another
person - that erôs and its pure independent religion and creative
imagination (the love story as the the pleroma and cycle of archetypes)
has been degraded (naturalized, biologized and sexualized),
concealed, slandered, appropriated, inappropriately gendered,
imprisoned by historical power structures and their myths and
narratives.
Following Hegel we can see the development of
art, literature and drama in ancient Greece as having (through the
self-discovery of the freedom of the creative imagination dissolving
religion and prefiguring the science of consciousness, which Jung did
not seem to understand ) a parallel significance to that of the
spiritual culture of philosophy. This is what inspired Shelley to write
Prometheus Unbound. Indeed this development in ancient Greek
literature manifests the spiritual interpretation and transfiguration of
nature which is irreconcilable with corrupt religious cults.
The
modern and post-modern world seems heavily based on 'false forks',
pairs of linked vague concepts which function like twin semantic
whirlpools forcing the mind into two of equally false and harmful
options. Forked concepts contain two components which appear opposed and
even unconnected while in reality sharing the same life-blood, function
and essence. Forked concepts are 'false flag concepts' and correspond
to 'every accusation is a confession', one side accuses the other of
the exact same thing that that side in reality is guilty of. Each side
presents the other side as being the only possible alternative. It is a
strawmanning of the negation. Forked concepts are standard parts of
the apologetic arsenal of organized religions and cults.
The
considerations set forth here do not claim to completely illuminated the
multi-headed hydra of the monster concept 'religion'. What we need is
a pure a priori system of axioms, universal principles which demarcate
'pure religion' from a religion that is both false and harmful
(historically, socially, culturally, scientifically, philosophically,
psychologically, spiritually) and which perverts, appropriates and
hijacks ethics and morality: ones steeped in bloodshed, cruelty,
ignorance, racism and deceit, in making pacts for worldly ends through
blood and sacrifice to one or more capricious immoral beings (whose
activity is limited to war, sex, quarreling, food and enjoying
sacrifices).
In cultures dominated by a corrupt religion often a
kind of semi-science of consciousness develops (which in some cultures
and historical epochs is designated by the (universal) religion of love,
the science of love, science of the heart) - although compromised by
the enveloping religion and its psychological conditioning. Note
that we have discussed the science of consciousness both in its pure
solid form and in a more problematic 'relational' form based on a
platonic theory of love.
The fork: bad religion is a human
cultural construction, the product of the worst instincts, impulses and
ideas mankind has to offer (or in which one small social group has used
to control, terrorize and exploit others). But exactly the same
instincts, impulses and ideas can be given apparently non-religious and
equally bad materialistic and pseudo-scientific form. This is the key to
understanding the history of the last three hundred years.
Addendum
on the 'religion of love' in the West. The domination of a religious
organization throughout the centuries is a complex affair. The
substratum, the oppressed and hidden essence, will have its voice.
Under the tragic tyranny of a thousand years there were yet some
manifestations of covert yet very powerful and significant revolution
and rebellion, which we can inner spiritual 'transfigurations' and
'transformations' which while retaining the veil and semblance of
submission to the reigning religious power and literalist dogma
concealed something of an entirely different philosophical and
spiritual nature (though conveniently couched in a theological language
in a way that would be interesting to compare to the treatment of
revealed religion in Hegel's phenomenology of spirit). The signs of
such manifestations are everything which concerns the art, culture and
poetry of 'spiritual', 'mystical', 'platonic' or 'neoplatonic' love (and
is found in the Middle Ages, in the renaissance and specially in the
baroque). Deification of the human, humanization of the divine,
spiritual love as the supreme and principle sacrament and path described
in the language and concepts of the reigning theology. Furthermore this
religion of love involved a sophisticated and highly developed (based
on concrete spiritual experience) philosophy of the soul and of the
self and the overcoming of the self and of rebirth which is both
complementary and compatible with the philosophy of Buddhism and which
furthermore purifies, builds and improves upon the doctrines of the
'Christian mystics'. The symbol of a rose upon the cross is very apt,
showing the unity between Buddhist anatta and the 'amor' of divine
union. See the article about Sor Violante do Céu in this collection.
Monday, November 10, 2025
Philosophy and Prehistory
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